Norphlet Arkansas Construction Expert Witness Directory

Prefatory Contract Language Cannot Be Used to Create an Ambiguity with Operative Provisions

May 12, 2026 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Contract drafting and interpretation matters. A case dealt with the potential conflict with prefatory language in an agreement compared with operative provisions in the agreement. The trial court held that the operative provisions control. I discussed this case here where the appellate court reversed based on the prefatory language. But, through a motion for rehearing, the appellate court reconsidered its position and affirmed the trial court based on the operative provisions, mainly that the prefatory language cannot be used to create an ambiguity with operative provisions. Consider this explanation in affirming the trial court:

Because the trial court correctly found that the initial language in the contract was prefatory and could not be used to create an ambiguity in the remainder of the contract, we affirm the final judgment.

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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

'Drywall Isn't Light': Peter Lupo on Safety Management at Standard Drywall

May 26, 2026 — Elaine Silver - Engineering News-Record
Peter Lupo has been safety director since 2019 at San Diego-based Standard Drywall Inc., a major wall and ceiling contractor. He draws on over two decades of safety experience across a wide range of commercial construction work, having previously served as safety director for general contractor T.B. Penick & Sons. He has also previously operated Peter Lupo Consulting, where he reviewed legal cases and provided expert testimony, and blogged on safety for ENR.com. Lupo recently spoke to ENR Correspondent Elaine Silver about the weight of drywall, heat hazard control, bilingual crews and how he supports safety creativity and learning on the Standard Drywall staff. The conversation has been edited. Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Elaine Silver, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com

Federal Court Strikes Down New York’s Climate Superfund Act: What It Means for the “Polluter Pays” Movement

September 28, 2026 — Amanda G. Halter, Ashleigh K. Myers & Jillian Marullo - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law Blog
A federal judge in the Northern District of New York has struck down New York’s Climate Change Superfund Act, ruling that the “polluter pays” climate law is preempted by federal law and “simply beyond the limits of state law.” The court concluded that the Clean Air Act (CAA) does not authorize New York’s compensation scheme, which calculates liability based on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions attributable to worldwide fossil fuel extraction and refining. It separately held that any cost-recovery demand against a foreign producer would be preempted under the constitutional foreign affairs doctrine, which limits state intrusion into matters committed predominantly to the federal government. The court directed the parties to file a status report by September 14, leaving the form of further relief unresolved. In practical terms, the court has decided that the Act is preempted and cannot be enforced but has not yet determined the precise terms of its final order, including whether to formally enjoin its enforcement. The decision in West Virginia v. James, Case No. 1:25-cv-00168 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2026), issued by Chief U.S. District Judge Brenda K. Sannes, who was appointed by President Obama, marks the first judicial invalidation of a state climate superfund statute and carries significant implications for the climate superfund landscape and the three remaining lawsuits challenging these laws. Reprinted courtesy of Amanda G. Halter, Pillsbury, Ashleigh K. Myers, Pillsbury and Jillian Marullo, Pillsbury Ms. Halter may be contacted at amanda.halter@pillsburylaw.com Ms. Myers may be contacted at ashleigh.myers@pillsburylaw.com Ms. Marullo may be contacted at jillian.marullo@pillsburylaw.com Read the full story...

Los Angeles Times Ranks Lewis Brisbois Third Largest Firm in LA County, Largest for Litigation

June 08, 2026 — Lewis Brisbois
The Los Angeles Times has ranked Lewis Brisbois the third largest firm in LA County by attorney headcount, and first for number of litigation attorneys. Lewis Brisbois, whose Los Angeles office is led by Co-Managing Partners Jana I. Lubert and Kathleen Walker, has 273 attorneys working in LA County, including 167 partners. The firm ranked No. 1 for Litigation in the county, with 206 attorneys under the leadership of Partner Craig Holden. Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Lewis Brisbois

Utah’s Emerging Framework for Responsible Data Center Development

September 08, 2026 — Denise A. Dragoo & Josh Miller - Snell & Wilmer
Utah is establishing itself as one of the nation’s most attractive jurisdictions for large-scale data center development, with a structured, defensible regulatory pathway that gives developers and investors the clarity needed to deploy capital at scale. The cornerstone is Executive Order 2026-03, “Establishing a Higher Bar for Data Center Development in Utah,” signed by Governor Spencer J. Cox on May 29, 2026. The Executive Order creates an actionable compliance framework letting developers demonstrate stewardship across water, air quality, energy, wildlife, and community engagement – reducing regulatory and reputational risk. Recent enactments on energy self-supply and water rights operationalize these principles, while a few counties have adopted short-term local moratoria to update zoning; understanding how these interact with the state framework matters for site selection. Reprinted courtesy of Denise A. Dragoo, Snell & Wilmer and Josh Miller, Snell & Wilmer Ms. Dragoo may be contacted at ddragoo@swlaw.com Mr. Miller may be contacted at jmiller@swlaw.com Read the full story...

Anomaly in Adding a Third-Party Claimant to a Liability Insurance Coverage Dispute

May 05, 2026 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
In an insurance coverage lawsuit seeking declaratory relief, an insurer sued the third-party claimant. The insurer was seeking a declaration that there was no coverage, which naturally would impact the third-party claimant. The insured did not respond to the lawsuit and the insurer moved for a default judgment which was objected to by the third-party claimant. The trial court granted a final judgment in favor of the insurer, which prompted an appeal from the third-party claimant because the final judgment impacts its rights to coverage if it obtains a judgment against the insured. The appellate court reversed but please take a look at this Court’s discussion on the issue of an insurer adding a third-party claimant to a coverage lawsuit when then the third-party cannot pursue a direct claim against the insurer until it obtains a settlement or judgment against the insured. It presents an interesting argument and counter-point for a third-party claimant that is added to the coverage lawsuit which has implications if it obtains a judgment against the insured: This case involves an apparent anomaly in Florida law. It is well-established that third-party claimants injured by an insured’s negligence have a right as third-party beneficiaries to payment from the insured’s insurance proceeds. It is equally well-established that the third-party claimants’ rights in this regard do not accrue unless and until they obtain a verdict or settlement against the insured. A quick review of this law is helpful at this point. Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

Function Over Form: Eighth Circuit Narrows Application of Cosmetic Damage Exclusion

October 12, 2026 — Ali Jamwal - SDV Fenchurch
Introduction In a significant decision for policyholders, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted a narrow interpretation of an exclusion for cosmetic roof damage caused by wind or hail.[1] The court held that for a cosmetic damage exclusion to apply, an insurer must prove that the roof’s ability to function as a barrier to the elements is not impaired as compared to its functionality prior to the loss or damage. Background In April 2022, a hailstorm struck the insured school buildings causing indentations in the buildings’ metal roofs. The hail did not puncture the roofs’ metal, and no leaks were reported. The insurer denied the claim based on the policy’s cosmetic damage exclusion, which precluded coverage for “cosmetic damage to roof surfacing caused by wind and/or hail.” Cosmetic damage was defined as “superficial damage that altered the appearance of the roof surfacing, but such damage does not prevent the roof from continuing to function as a barrier to entrance of the elements to the same extent as it did before.” Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Ali Jamwal, SDV Fenchurch
Mr. Jamwal may be contacted at ali.jamwal@sdvfenchurch.us

Doctrine of Substantial Performance When It Comes to Payment

July 27, 2026 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A recent non-construction case touches upon the doctrine of substantial performance when it comes to payment. In this case, a club was to make two payments to secure a rapper’s attendance. The first payment was made. The second payment was made but was a few hundred dollars short of the agreed amount. The rapper did not show up. The club claimed it substantially performed its obligations. At first glance, the argument makes sense because the second payment fell only a few hundred dollars short. But that wasn’t the case when it comes to pre-commencement payment obligations:

Substantial performance applies only when the variance from the contract terms “is inadvertent or unintentional and unimportant so that the work actually performed is substantially what was called for in the contract.” However, when one party agrees to pay the other on or before a specific date, time is of the essence, and the payor is required to pay the payee on or before that date. “There is almost always no such thing as ‘substantial performance’ of payment between commercial parties when the duty is simply the general one to pay. Payment is either made in the amount and on the date due, or it is not.”

Big Gate Records, LLC v. Washington, 51 Fla.L.Weekly D1281a (Fla. 2nd DCA 2026) (internal citations omitted).