Approaches in the Absence of a Differing Site Conditions Clause
April 10, 2019 —
Parker A. Lewton - Smith CurrieA contractor who has encountered unforeseen conditions will typically rely on the contract’s differing site conditions clause as a means to recovery. Most construction contracts address those issues directly. In ConsensusDocs Standard Agreement and General Conditions between Owner and Constructor, the starting point is § 3.16.2. But what if the contract does not contain a differing site conditions clause? Or, what if the contract does contain such a clause, but the contractor failed to provide adequate notice or satisfy other conditions or requirements of the contract? When reliance on a differing site conditions clause is impractical, a contractor still may seek recovery in certain instances under one or more of the following legal theories: misrepresentation; fraud; duty to disclose; breach of implied warranty; and mutual mistake.
Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation occurs when an owner “misleads a contractor by a negligently untrue representation of fact[.]” John Massman Contracting Co. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 24, 31 (1991) (citing Morrison–Knudsen Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 712, 718–19, 345 F.2d 535, 539 (1965)). A contractor may be able to recover extra costs incurred, under a theory of misrepresentation, if it can show that (1) the owner made an erroneous representation, (2) the erroneous representation went to a material fact, (3) the contractor honestly and reasonably relied on that representation, and (4) the contractor’s reliance on the erroneous representation was to the contractor’s detriment. See T. Brown Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 132 F.3d 724, 728–29 (Fed. Cir. 1997). These four requirements can be satisfied, for example, through the use of deposition testimony detailing the owner’s representations and the contractor’s reliance thereon. See, e.g., C & H Commercial Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 246, 256–57 (1996).
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Parker A. Lewton, Smith CurrieMr. Parker may be contacted at
palewton@smithcurrie.com
Application of Frye Test to Determine Admissibility of Expert
April 03, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesFlorida went back to the Frye test/standard, instead of the Daubert test utilized in federal court, to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. The Frye test is more favorable to plaintiffs because it applies when an expert renders an opinion based on new or novel scientific principles. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Heron’s Landing Condominium Ass’n of Jacksonville, Inc., 44 Fla.L.Weekly D109b (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“The supreme court has described the Frye test as one in which the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has developed or improved to the point where the experts in the field widely share the view that the results are scientifically reliable as accurate. Stated differently, under Frye, the proponent of the evidence has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence with the general acceptance of the underlying scientific principles and methodology. However, as stated, the Frye standard only applies when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific principles.”).
In D.R. Horton, Inc., a condominium association sued the developer and general contractor (same entity) for construction defects that included claims in negligence, violation of building code, and breach of statutory warranties. The developer/general contractor moved in limine / to strike the association’s experts under, at the time, a Daubert analysis, but which became a Frye analysis during the pendency of the appeal. The expert opined as to construction defects and damage and the appropriate repairs – really, no different than any construction defect dispute, from what it appeared. The trial court denied the motion and during trial the experts testified and a sizable damages judgment was entered against the developer/contractor prompting the appeal. One issue on appeal was the admissibility of the expert’s opinion. The appellate court noted that a Frye analysis is not necessary because the experts used a scientifically reliable and peer-reviewed methodology.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Texas Supreme Court Holds Anadarko’s $100M Deepwater Horizon Defense Costs Are Not Subject To Joint Venture Liability Limits
February 27, 2019 —
Sergio F. Oehninger & Michael S. Levine - Hunton Andrews KurthReversing a Texas Court of Appeals decision that allowed Anadarko’s Lloyd’s of London excess insurers to escape coverage for more than $100 million in defense costs incurred in connection with claims from the Deepwater Horizon well blowout, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the insurers’ obligations to pay defense costs under an “energy package” liability policy are not capped by a joint venture coverage limit for “liability” insured. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. et al. v. Houston Casualty Co. et al., No. 16-1013 (Tex. Jan. 25, 2019).
While the Lloyd’s of London insurers had agreed to pay Anadarko $37.5 million for damages, they declined to cover $100 million-plus in defense fees, arguing that both Anadarko’s liability and defense expenses are subject to the $37.5 million joint venture limit for “liability” insured. Anadarko asserted that only amounts paid as damages to third parties are subject to that limit. Defense costs, however, are not amounts paid as damages to a third party and, thus, are not a “liability.” Those amounts, therefore, are not subject to the joint venture limit and are instead subject to the policy’s $150 million coverage limit.
Reprinted courtesy of
Sergio F. Oehninger, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Oehninger may be contacted at soehninger@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
A Few Green Building Notes
April 03, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsThis past week, the blogosphere (if that’s even the word these days) has been abuzz about green building and the value that green can add to a project. Three items in particular (among many) got my attention.
The first of these was the fact that a new private sustainability rating system is ready for launch. The Institute for Sustainable Infrastructure (or ISI) is seeking public comment on its proposed envISIon. This new system (aptly dubbed Version 1.0) will go “live” in July for comment. Why mention this new system? First of all, ISI’s founding members are the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), the American Public Works Association (APWA) and the American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC). This trio gives the new program some fairly heavy weight backing. Second, while there are rating systems aside from the ever present LEED, none have taken hold in any real way to compete with LEED. I am curious to see if the envISIon system has any better luck. Finally, this shows that sustainable building is of interest to more than the USGBC and those of us that discuss LEED on a daily basis. I find this to be a great thing that could lead to more societal acceptance of sustainable practices as a standard practice rather than a goal.
Hopefully such efforts will offset the other two notes that caught my eye recently.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
To Bee or Not to Bee - CA Court Finds Denial of Coverage Based on Exclusion was Premature Where Facts had not been Judicially Determined
November 28, 2018 —
Philip B. Wilusz - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.While I typically discuss cases concerning pollution, today I will change a few letters around and discuss pollination. The case, Unigard Insurance Co. et al. v. George Perry and Sons Inc. et al., asks whether there is coverage for a lawsuit brought against a commercial farm that is alleged to have killed off bee colonies used for pollination. The farm, owned by George Perry & Sons Inc. (“Perry”), allegedly used a pesticide that killed off the bee colonies that Perry had hired from Gary Mattes (“Mattes”) pursuant to an oral agreement. The bees, operating well outside of their weight class, were hired to pollinate Perry’s crops of watermelons and pumpkins. Interestingly, the bees would be brought to the farm in either large hives or “nukes,” which are smaller versions of hives.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at
pbw@sdvlaw.com
Hunton Insurance Partner, Larry Bracken, Elected to the American College of Coverage Counsel
March 04, 2019 —
Michael S. Levine - Hunton Andrews KurthLawrence J. Bracken II, a partner in Hunton Andrews Kurth’s Insurance Coverage practice group, has been elected to the American College of Coverage Counsel (ACCC), which is the preeminent association of U.S. and Canadian lawyers who represent the interests of insurers and policyholders. The ACCC’s mission is to advance the creative, ethical and efficient resolution of insurance coverage and extracontractual disputes; to enhance the civility and quality of the practice of insurance law; to provide peer-reviewed scholarship; and to improve the relationships among the members of our profession. The ACCC engages in a rigorous vetting process prior to inviting a lawyer to become a fellow. ACCC fellows include many of the most prominent members of the insurance law bar.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews KurthMr. Levine may be contacted at
mlevine@HuntonAK.com
The California Legislature Return the Power Back to the People by Passing the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
January 02, 2019 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq., David A. Napper, Esq., & Lana Halavi – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & BargerIntroduction
Data breaches and social media hacks are becoming increasingly common stories on the news cycle. Meanwhile, companies have made fortunes on unsuspecting individuals by selling information gathered on the user. Every internet user has wondered why a pop-up ad or banner on an unrelated website relates to something you purchased or searched for "that one time. The California legislature has decided to return some power back to the people with the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. California is the first state to introduce privacy protection for individuals personal data and could pave the way for other states to follow suit in the near future.
The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
On June 28, 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 ("the Act"). The California Legislature eagerly passed the Act, which comes into effect on January 1, 2020, granting broad new privacy rights to "consumers" and enforcing requirements on the protection of their personal data allowing consumers the right to take back control of their personal information.
A "consumer" is defined as a "resident of California as defined by California's personal income tax regulations. "Personal information" pursuant to the Act is defined as "information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household." Personal information is generally recognized in California as information that can identify a specific individual. The Act also includes information that can be used to identify a household.
Provisions of the Act
Pursuant to the Act, consumers are given the right to know upon request if their personal information is disclosed, and to whom it is disclosed, the right to know what personal information has been collected about them by a business, the right to object to the sale of their personal information, the right to obtain data collected about them, the right to require businesses to obliterate their personal information, and the right to be given equal service and pricing from businesses, including equal prices and quality of goods or services. The Act forbids discrimination by businesses against consumers for exercising their privacy rights pursuant to the Act.
Businesses are, however, permitted to charge different prices or provide different quality of service to consumers if the difference is "reasonably related to the value provided to the consumer by the consumer’s data." Additionally, businesses must allow consumers to exercise their rights by providing to consumers toll-free telephone numbers and/or websites to request such information or privacy. If a consumer sends a verified request for information to a business, the business subsequently has 45 days to give the consumer the requested information from the preceding 12 months with no charge to the consumer.
Who Must Comply with the Act
The Act will apply to for-profit businesses that do business in the State of California, deal with personal information of California residents, and either·(1) have more than $25 million in annual gross revenues, or (2) receive or disclose more than 50,000 California residents' personal information, or(3) derive 50% or greater of California residents' annual revenues from selling their personal information.
Who is Exempted from Compliance with the Act
A for-profit company, a small company, and/or a company that does not derive large amounts of personal information and does not share a brand with an affiliate covered by the Act is exempted from complying with the Act. Additionally, a company is exempted from compliance with the Act "if every aspect of . . . commercial conduct takes place wholly outside of California," meaning: (1) the personal information was collected from the consumer while they were outside California, (2) no sale of their personal information took place in California, and (3) there was no sale of personal information that was collected while the consumer was in California.
Impact
According to 2017 estimates, California's population totaled approximately 39 million people. Clearly the Act will affect an incredibly large amount of people considering it concerns the most populous state in America. The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, which is being compared to the EU General Data Protection Regulation for its all-encompassing method and resilient privacy protections is also speculated to have an impact on businesses throughout the nation and around the world. While the costs will likely go up for companies to do business in California, the transparency and trust earned by business and gained by consumers in this new landscape could potential overcome the initial costs to provide these required services. Perhaps most importantly however, is if California consumers decide to take advantage of the new protections, they will no longer have to wonder what for-profit businesses are doing with their data.
Reprinted courtesy of Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger attorneys
Richard H. Glucksman,
David A. Napper and
Lana Halavi
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Napper may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Eleventh Circuit Holds that EPA Superfund Remedial Actions are Usually Entitled to the FTCA “Discretionary Function” Exemption
February 18, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelAn unusual Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, known also as Superfund) remedial action has resulted in a broad ruling that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) remedial actions and their implementation by EPA contractors may be entitled to broad protection from liability insofar as the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is involved. The case is Gadsden Industrial Park LLC v. United States of America, CMC Inc., and Harsco Corporation, an unpublished opinion released by the court on November 30, 2018.
After the Gulf States Steel Corporation, the owner and operator of a former steel manufacturing facility located in Gadsden, AL, declared bankruptcy, in 2002, Gadsden Industrial Park LLC (Gadsden) purchased 434 acres of the 761 acre site, as well as assets located in what is described as the “Excluded Real Property”—recyclable materials generated in the steel making process known as “kish” and “slag,” and a track of a railroad line located in this area. However, in the 2007 or 2008, the Eleventh Circuit observes, EPA began a CERCLA remedial cleanup action on the Excluded Real Property and barred Gadsden from entering the Excluded Real Property to make use of its new assets.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
